Hard Problem of Consciousness
A Hard Problem of Consciousness is a intellectual challenge of how and why conscious humans have qualia (how sensations light-up for us with colors and tastes).
- Context:
- It can (typically) be a part of a Theory of Consciousness.
- …
- Counter-Example(s):
- See: Human Consciousness, Phenomenology, Qualia, Theory of Mind, Functionalism (Philosophy of Mind), Qualia.
References
2015
- (Wikipedia, 2015) ⇒ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/hard_problem_of_consciousness Retrieved:2015-2-1.
- The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining how and why we have qualia or phenomenal experiences — how sensations acquire characteristics, such as colours and tastes. David Chalmers, who introduced the term "hard problem" of consciousness, contrasts this with the "easy problems" of explaining the ability to discriminate, integrate information, report mental states, focus attention, etc. Easy problems are easy because all that is required for their solution is to specify a mechanism that can perform the function. That is, their proposed solutions, regardless of how complex or poorly understood they may be, can be entirely consistent with the modern materialistic conception of natural phenomena. Chalmers claims that the problem of experience is distinct from this set, and he argues that the problem of experience will "persist even when the performance of all the relevant functions is explained".
The existence of a "hard problem" is controversial and has been disputed by some philosophers. Providing an answer to this question could lie in understanding the roles that physical processes play in creating consciousness and the extent to which these processes create our subjective qualities of experience.
Several questions about consciousness must be resolved in order to acquire a full understanding of it. These questions include, but are not limited to, whether being conscious could be wholly described in physical terms, such as the aggregation of neural processes in the brain.
If consciousness cannot be explained exclusively by physical events, it must transcend the capabilities of physical systems and require an explanation of nonphysical means. For philosophers who assert that consciousness is nonphysical in nature, there remains a question about what outside of physical theory is required to explain consciousness.
- The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining how and why we have qualia or phenomenal experiences — how sensations acquire characteristics, such as colours and tastes. David Chalmers, who introduced the term "hard problem" of consciousness, contrasts this with the "easy problems" of explaining the ability to discriminate, integrate information, report mental states, focus attention, etc. Easy problems are easy because all that is required for their solution is to specify a mechanism that can perform the function. That is, their proposed solutions, regardless of how complex or poorly understood they may be, can be entirely consistent with the modern materialistic conception of natural phenomena. Chalmers claims that the problem of experience is distinct from this set, and he argues that the problem of experience will "persist even when the performance of all the relevant functions is explained".
2012
- (Weisberg, 2012) ⇒ Josh Weisberg. (2012). “Hard Problem of Consciousness." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- QUOTE: The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why any physical state is conscious rather than nonconscious. It is the problem of explaining why there is “something it is like” for a subject in conscious experience, why conscious mental states “light up” and …
2009
- (Howell & Alter, 2009) ⇒ Robert J. Howell, and Torin Alter. (2009). “Hard Problem of Consciousness." Scholarpedia, 4(6).
- QUOTE: The hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers 1995) is the problem of explaining the relationship between physical phenomena, such as brain processes, and experience (ie, phenomenal consciousness, or mental states/events with phenomenal qualities or qualia). …
2004
- (Gray, 2004) ⇒ Jeffrey Alan Gray. "Consciousness: Creeping up on the hard problem." (2004).
1996
- (Chalmers, 1996) ⇒ David J. Chalmers. (1996). “The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory." Oxford University Press.
1995
- (Chalmers, 1995) ⇒ David J. Chalmers. (1995). “Facing up to the problem of consciousness.” In: Journal of consciousness studies, 2(3)
- QUOTE: … Getting the details right will probably take a century or two of difficult empirical work. Still, there is every reason to believe that the methods of cognitive science and neuroscience will succeed. The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. … This makes for a challenge to those who are serious about the hard problem of consciousness: What is your extra ingredient, and why should that account for conscious experience? …
… This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. …
- QUOTE: … Getting the details right will probably take a century or two of difficult empirical work. Still, there is every reason to believe that the methods of cognitive science and neuroscience will succeed. The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. … This makes for a challenge to those who are serious about the hard problem of consciousness: What is your extra ingredient, and why should that account for conscious experience? …