Bayesian Epistemologist
A Bayesian Epistemologist is an epistemologist who is a Bayesian.
- See: [[]].
References
2016
- http://m-phi.blogspot.com/2017/01/the-principal-principle-does-not-imply.html
- QUOTE: All Bayesian epistemologists agree on two claims. The first, which we might call Precise Credences, says that an agent's doxastic state at a given time t in her epistemic life can be represented by a single credence function Pt, which assigns to each proposition A about which she has an opinion a precise numerical value Pt(A) that is at least 0 and at most 1. Pt(A) is the agent's credence in A at t. It measures how strongly she believes A at t, or how confident she is at t that A is true. The second point of agreement, which is typically known as Probabilism, says that an agent's credence function at a given time should be a probability function: that is, for all times t, Pt(⊤)=1 for any tautology ⊤, Pt(⊥)=0 for any contradiction ⊥, and Pt(A∨B)=Pt(A)+Pt(B)−Pt(AB) for any propositions A and B.
So Precise Credences and Probabilism form the core of Bayesian epistemology. But, beyond these two norms, there is little agreement between its adherents. Bayesian epistemologists disagree along (at least) two dimensions. First, they disagree about the correct norms concerning updating on evidence learned with certainty --- some say they are diachronic norms concerning how an agent should in fact update; others say that there are only synchronic norms concerning how an agent should plan to update; and others think there are no norms concerning updating at all. Second, they disagree about the stringency of the synchronic norms that don't concern updating. Our concern here is with the latter.
- QUOTE: All Bayesian epistemologists agree on two claims. The first, which we might call Precise Credences, says that an agent's doxastic state at a given time t in her epistemic life can be represented by a single credence function Pt, which assigns to each proposition A about which she has an opinion a precise numerical value Pt(A) that is at least 0 and at most 1. Pt(A) is the agent's credence in A at t. It measures how strongly she believes A at t, or how confident she is at t that A is true. The second point of agreement, which is typically known as Probabilism, says that an agent's credence function at a given time should be a probability function: that is, for all times t, Pt(⊤)=1 for any tautology ⊤, Pt(⊥)=0 for any contradiction ⊥, and Pt(A∨B)=Pt(A)+Pt(B)−Pt(AB) for any propositions A and B.