Branden Fitelson

Branden Fitelson is a person.

• See: Evidential Support, Epistemic Coherence, Epistemic Utility Theory.

---

---

References

• Personal Home Page: http://fitelson.org/
• Professional Homepage: http://www.philosophy.rutgers.edu/people/faculty/596-branden-fitelson
• Google Scholar Author Page: http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=guuEvwUAAAAJ

2007

• (Branden, 2007) ⇒ Branden Fitelson. (2007). “Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and Relational Confirmation.” In: Synthese, 156(3). doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9134-9
  • ABSTRACT: Likelihoodists and Bayesians seem to have a fundamental disagreement about the proper probabilistic explication of relational (or contrastive) conceptions of evidential support (or confirmation). In this paper, I will survey some recent arguments and results in this area, with an eye toward pinpointing the nexus of the dispute. This will lead, first, to an important shift in the way the debate has been couched, and, second, to an alternative explication of relational support, which is in some sense a “middle way” between Likelihoodism and Bayesianism. In the process, I will propose some new work for an old probability puzzle: the “Monty Hall” problem.

2002

• (Eells & Branden, 2002) ⇒ Ellery Eells, and Branden Fitelson. (2002). “Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support." Philosophical Studies, 107(2).
  • ABSTRACT: Several forms of symmetry in degrees of evidential support are considered. Some of these symmetries are shown not to hold in general. This has implications for the adequacy of many measures of degree of evidential support that have been proposed and defended in the philosophical literature.

1999

• (Branden, 1999) ⇒ Branden Fitelson. (1999). “The plurality of Bayesian measures of confirmation and the problem of measure sensitivity." Philosophy of Science, 66. (Proceedings of the 1998 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association).
  • ABSTRACT: Contemporary Bayesian confirmation theorists measure degree of (incremental) confirmation using a variety of non-equivalent relevance measures. As a result, a great many of the arguments surrounding quantitative Bayesian confirmation theory are implicitly sensitive to choice of measure of confirmation. Such arguments are enthymematic, since they tacitly presuppose that certain relevance measures should be used (for various purposes) rather than other relevance measures that have been proposed and defended in the philosophical literature. I present a survey of this pervasive class of Bayesian confirmation-theoretic enthymemes, and a brief analysis of some recent attempts to resolve the problem of measure sensitivity.

---