Ethical Intuitionist Philosophy
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An Ethical Intuitionist Philosophy is a moral philosophy that our intuitive awareness of value forms the foundation of our ethical knowledge.
- AKA: Moral Intuitionism.
- …
- Counter-Example(s):
- See: Scientific Moral Intuitivism, Prima Facie Duty.
References
2015
- (Wikipedia, 2015) ⇒ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethical_intuitionism Retrieved:2015-11-21.
- Ethical intuitionism (also called moral intuitionism) is a family of views in moral epistemology (and, on some definitions, metaphysics). At minimum, ethical intuitionism is the thesis that our intuitive awareness of value, or intuitive knowledge of evaluative facts, forms the foundation of our ethical knowledge.
The view is at its core a foundationalism about moral beliefs: it is the view that some moral truths can be known non-inferentially (i.e., known without one needing to infer them from other truths one believes).
Such an epistemological view implies that there are moral beliefs with propositional contents; so it implies cognitivism.
- Ethical intuitionism (also called moral intuitionism) is a family of views in moral epistemology (and, on some definitions, metaphysics). At minimum, ethical intuitionism is the thesis that our intuitive awareness of value, or intuitive knowledge of evaluative facts, forms the foundation of our ethical knowledge.
1930
- (Ross, 1930) ⇒ William D. Ross. (1930). “The Right and the Good." Philip Stratton-Lake
- BOOK REVIEW: … Ross's book was originally published in 1930, and is the pinnacle of ethical intuitionism, which was the dominant moral theory in British philosophy for much of the 19th and early 20th century. The central concern of the book is with rightness and goodness, and their relation to one another. Ross argues against notable rival ethical theories. The right act, he holds, cannot be derived from the moral value of the motive from which it is done; furthermore, rightness is not wholly determined by the value of the consequences of one's action, whether this value is some benefit for the agent, or some agent‐neutral good. Rather, the right act is determined by a plurality of self‐evident prima facie duties. Ross portrayed rightness and goodness as simple non‐natural properties.