Agent Intention

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An Agent Intention is an Agent Deliberative Mental State that represents what a Rational Agent has chosen to do.




  • (Wikipedia, 2019) ⇒ Retrieved:2019-8-10.
    • A BDI agent is a particular type of bounded rational software agent, imbued with particular mental attitudes, viz: Beliefs, Desires and Intentions (BDI) (...)

      This section defines the idealized architectural components of a BDI system.

      • Beliefs: Beliefs represent the informational state of the agent, in other words its beliefs about the world (including itself and other agents). Beliefs can also include inference rules, allowing forward chaining to lead to new beliefs. Using the term belief rather than knowledge recognizes that what an agent believes may not necessarily be true (and in fact may change in the future).
        • Beliefset: Beliefs are stored in a database (sometimes called a belief base or a belief set), although that is an implementation decision.
      • Desires: Desires represent the motivational state of the agent. They represent objectives or situations that the agent would like to accomplish or bring about. Examples of desires might be: find the best price, go to the party or become rich.
        • Goals: A goal is a desire that has been adopted for active pursuit by the agent. Usage of the term goals adds the further restriction that the set of active desires must be consistent. For example, one should not have concurrent goals to go to a party and to stay at home – even though they could both be desirable.
      • Intentions: Intentions represent the deliberative state of the agent – what the agent has chosen to do. Intentions are desires to which the agent has to some extent committed. In implemented systems, this means the agent has begun executing a plan.
        • Plans: Plans are sequences of actions (recipes or knowledge areas) that an agent can perform to achieve one or more of its intentions. Plans may include other plans: my plan to go for a drive may include a plan to find my car keys. This reflects that in Bratman's model, plans are initially only partially conceived, with details being filled in as they progress.
      • Events: These are triggers for reactive activity by the agent. An event may update beliefs, trigger plans or modify goals. Events may be generated externally and received by sensors or integrated systems. Additionally, events may be generated internally to trigger decoupled updates or plans of activity.
BDI was also extended with an obligations component, giving rise to the BOID agent architecture[1] to incorporate obligations, norms and commitments of agents that act within a social environment.



  • (Wikipedia, 2015) ⇒ Retrieved:2015-12-24.
    • A goal is a desired result that a person or a system envisions, plans and commits to achieve: a personal or organizational desired end-point in some sort of assumed development. Many people endeavor to reach goals within a finite time by setting deadlines.

      It is roughly similar to purpose or aim, the anticipated result which guides reaction, or an end, which is an object, either a physical object or an abstract object, that has intrinsic value.






  • (Bratman, 1987) ⇒ Michael E. Bratman. (1987). “Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason." Harvard University Press
    • BOOK OVERVIEW: What happens to our conception of mind and rational agency when we take seriously future-directed intentions and plans and their roles as inputs into further practical reasoning? The author's initial efforts in responding to this question resulted in a series of papers that he wrote during the early 1980s. In this book, Bratman develops further some of the main themes of these essays and also explores a variety of related ideas and issues. He develops a planning theory of intention. Intentions are treated as elements of partial plans of action. These plans play basic roles in practical reasoning, roles that support the organization of our activities over time and socially. Bratman explores the impact of this approach on a wide range of issues, including the relation between intention and intentional action, and the distinction between intended and expected effects of what one intends.



  • (Grice, 1957) ⇒ H. Paul. Grice. (1957). “Meaning." The philosophical review.
    • QUOTE: … Similarly in nonlinguistic cases: if we are asking about an agent's intention, a previous expression counts heavily; nevertheless, a man might plan to throw a letter in the dustbin and yet take it to the post; when lifting his hand he might "come to" and say either "I didn't intend to do …

  1. J. Broersen, M. Dastani, J. Hulstijn, Z. Huang, L. van der Torre The BOID architecture: conflicts between beliefs, obligations, intentions and desires Proceedings of the fifth International Conference on Autonomous agents Pages 9-16, ACM New York, NY, USA