Social Choice Theory
A Social Choice Theory is a decision theory that covers social choices.
- AKA: Collective Decision Theory.
- …
- Counter-Example(s):
- See: Voting Paradox, Individual Value, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, Welfare Economics, Voting Theory, Methodological Individualism.
References
2014
- (Wikipedia, 2014) ⇒ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/social_choice_theory Retrieved:2014-6-22.
- Social choice theory or social choice is a theoretical framework for analysis of combining individual opinions, preferences, interests, or welfares to reach a collective decision or social welfare in some sense.[1] A non-theoretical example of a collective decision is enacting a law or set of laws under a constitution. Social choice theory dates from Condorcet's formulation of the voting paradox. Kenneth Arrow's Social Choice and Individual Values (1951) and Arrow's impossibility theorem in it are generally acknowledged as the basis of the modern social choice theory.
Social choice blends elements of welfare economics and voting theory. It is methodologically individualistic, in that it aggregates preferences and behaviors of individual members of society. Using elements of formal logic for generality, analysis proceeds from a set of seemingly reasonable axioms of social choice to form a social welfare function (or constitution). [2] Results uncovered the logical incompatibility of various axioms, as in Arrow's theorem, revealing an aggregation problem and suggesting reformulation or theoretical triage in dropping some axiom(s). Later work also considers approaches to compensations and fairness, liberty and rights, axiomatic domain restrictions on preferences of agents, variable populations, strategy-proofing of social-choice mechanisms, natural resources, [3] capabilities and functionings, [4] and welfare, [5] justice, [6] and poverty. [7]
Social choice and public choice theory may overlap but are disjoint if narrowly construed. The Journal of Economic Literature classification codes place Social Choice under Microeconomics at JEL D71 (with Clubs, Committees, and Associations) whereas most Public Choice subcategories are in JEL D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior).
- Social choice theory or social choice is a theoretical framework for analysis of combining individual opinions, preferences, interests, or welfares to reach a collective decision or social welfare in some sense.[1] A non-theoretical example of a collective decision is enacting a law or set of laws under a constitution. Social choice theory dates from Condorcet's formulation of the voting paradox. Kenneth Arrow's Social Choice and Individual Values (1951) and Arrow's impossibility theorem in it are generally acknowledged as the basis of the modern social choice theory.
- ↑ Amartya Sen, 2008. “social choice,". The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, Abstract & TOC.
- ↑ For example, in Kenneth J. Arrow, 1951, Social Choice and Individual Values, ch. II, section 2, A Notation for Preferences and Choice, and ch. III, "The Social Welfare Function".
- ↑ Walter Bossert and John A. Weymark, 2008. “social choice (new developments)," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, Abstract & TOC.
- ↑ Basu Kaushik and Luis F. Lòpez-Calva, 2011. “Functionings and Capabilities," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, v. 2, pp. 153-187. Abstract.
- ↑ Claude d'Aspremont and Louis Gevers, 2002. “Social Welfare Functionals and Interpersonal Comparability," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, v. 1, ch. 10, pp. 459–541. Abstract.
- ↑ • Amartya Sen[1987] 2008. “justice," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition. Abstract & TOC.
• Bertil Tungodden, 2008. “justice (new perspectives)," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition. Abstract.
• Louis Kaplow, 2008. “Pareto principle and competing principles," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition. Abstract.
• Amartya K. Sen, 1970 [1984]. Collective Choice and Social Welfare (description):
ch. 9, "Equity and Justice," pp. 131-51.
ch. 9*, "Impersonality and Collective Quasi-Orderings," pp. 152-160.
• Kenneth J. Arrow, 1983. Collected Papers, v. 1, Social Choice and Justice. Description, contents, and chapter-preview links.
• Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert, and David Donaldson, 2002. “Utilitarianism and the Theory of Justice, Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, v. 1, ch. 11, pp. 543–596. Abstract. - ↑ Bhaskar Dutta, 2002. Inequality, Poverty and Welfare, Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, ch. 12, pp. 597–633. Abstract.
2013
- http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/social-choice/
- Social choice theory is the study of collective decision processes and procedures. It is not a single theory, but a cluster of models and results concerning the aggregation of individual inputs (e.g., votes, preferences, judgments, welfare) into collective outputs (e.g., collective decisions, preferences, judgments, welfare). Central questions are: How can a group of individuals choose a winning outcome (e.g., policy, electoral candidate) from a given set of options? What are the properties of different voting systems? When is a voting system democratic? How can a collective (e.g., electorate, legislature, collegial court, expert panel, or committee) arrive at coherent collective preferences or judgments on some issues, on the basis of its members' individual preferences or judgments? How can we rank different social alternatives in an order of social welfare? Social choice theorists study these questions not just by looking at examples, but by developing general models and proving theorems.
Pioneered in the 18th century by Nicolas de Condorcet and Jean-Charles de Borda and in the 19th century by Charles Dodgson (also known as Lewis Carroll), social choice theory took off in the 20th century with the works of Kenneth Arrow, Amartya Sen, and Duncan Black. Its influence extends across economics, political science, philosophy, mathematics, and recently computer science and biology. Apart from contributing to our understanding of collective decision procedures, social choice theory has applications in the areas of institutional design, welfare economics, and social epistemology.
- Social choice theory is the study of collective decision processes and procedures. It is not a single theory, but a cluster of models and results concerning the aggregation of individual inputs (e.g., votes, preferences, judgments, welfare) into collective outputs (e.g., collective decisions, preferences, judgments, welfare). Central questions are: How can a group of individuals choose a winning outcome (e.g., policy, electoral candidate) from a given set of options? What are the properties of different voting systems? When is a voting system democratic? How can a collective (e.g., electorate, legislature, collegial court, expert panel, or committee) arrive at coherent collective preferences or judgments on some issues, on the basis of its members' individual preferences or judgments? How can we rank different social alternatives in an order of social welfare? Social choice theorists study these questions not just by looking at examples, but by developing general models and proving theorems.