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- an Extrinsic Value.
- See: Value Judgement, Essentialist Belief, Philosophic Value, Object (Philosophy), Kantianism, Instrumental Value, Eudaemonist, Axiology.
- (Wikipedia, 2015) ⇒ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/intrinsic_value_(ethics) Retrieved:2015-10-4.
- Intrinsic value is an ethical and philosophic property. It is the ethical or philosophic value that an object has "in itself" or "for its own sake", as an intrinsic property. An object with intrinsic value may be regarded as an end or (in Kantian terminology) end-in-itself.  It is contrasted with instrumental value (or extrinsic value), the value of which depends on how much it generates intrinsic value.  For an eudaemonist, happiness (human flourishing) has intrinsic value, while having a family may not have intrinsic value, yet be instrumental, since it generates happiness. Intrinsic value is a term employed in axiology, the study of quality or value.
- Ivo de Gennaro, Value: Sources and Readings on a Key Concept of the Globalized World, BRILL, 2012, p. 138.
- Environmental Values, based on Singer, Peter "The Environmental Challenge", Ian Marsh, edit., Melbourne, Australia: Longman Cheshire, 1991, 0-582-87125-5. pp. 12
- QUOTE: Many philosophers take intrinsic value to be crucial to a variety of moral judgments. For example, according to a fundamental form of consequentialism, whether an action is morally right or wrong has exclusively to do with whether its consequences are intrinsically better than those of any other action one can perform under the circumstances. Many other theories also hold that what it is right or wrong to do has at least in part to do with the intrinsic value of the consequences of the actions one can perform. Moreover, if, as is commonly believed, what one is morally responsible for doing is some function of the rightness or wrongness of what one does, then intrinsic value would seem relevant to judgments about responsibility, too. Intrinsic value is also often taken to be pertinent to judgments about moral justice (whether having to do with moral rights or moral desert), insofar as it is good that justice is done and bad that justice is denied, in ways that appear intimately tied to intrinsic value. Finally, it is typically thought that judgments about moral virtue and vice also turn on questions of intrinsic value, inasmuch as virtues are good, and vices bad, again in ways that appear closely connected to such value.