2004 EffortforPaymentaTaleofTwoMarke

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Subject Headings: Social Norm, Market Norm, Social Market, Monetary Market.

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Abstract

The standard model of labor is one in which individuals trade their time and energy in return for monetary rewards. Building on Fiske's [[relational theory (1992)]], we propose that there are two types of markets that determine relationships between effort and payment: monetary and social. We hypothesize that monetary markets are highly sensitive to the magnitude of compensation, whereas social markets are not. This perspective can shed light on the well-established observation that people sometimes expend more effort in exchange for no payment (a social market) than they expend when they receive low payment (a monetary market). Three experiments support these ideas. The experimental evidence also demonstrates that mixed markets (markets that include aspects of both social and monetary markets) more closely resemble monetary than social markets.

1. Introduction

People often need help accomplishing tasks such as moving their possessions to a new residence, painting a room, preparing tax returns, and even taking care of their offspring. When we ask for help, we may wonder whom to approach and how best to motivate him or her. Should we ask a professional or a friend? If we ask a friend, should we offer compensation? If so, how much should we offer, and what form of compensation would be most effective? Would cash or token rewards (e.g., personal gifts or chocolates) provide a stronger incentive? Finally, are there interactions between these factors such that different levels of incentives are more or less effective for different forms of compensation?

References


 AuthorvolumeDate ValuetitletypejournaltitleUrldoinoteyear
2004 EffortforPaymentaTaleofTwoMarkeDan Ariely
James Heyman
Effort for Payment a Tale of Two Markets10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00757.x2004