Abstract Entity

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An abstract entity is an entity that does not have a physical location (is conceptual).



  • (Wikipedia, 2014) ⇒ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-physical_entity Retrieved:2014-11-4.
    • In ontology and the philosophy of mind, a non-physical entity is a spirit or being that exists outside of physical reality. Their existence divides the philosophical school of physicalism from the schools of idealism and dualism; with the latter schools holding that they can exist and the former holding that they cannot. If one posits that non-physical entities can exist, there exist further debates as to their inherent natures and their position relative to physical entities.


  1. Abrams, Meyer Howard; Harpham, Geoffrey Galt (2011). A Glossary of Literary Terms. ISBN 0495898023. http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=SUEtEa9nUWQC&pg=PA60#v=onepage&q&f=false. Retrieved 18 September 2012. 
  2. Armstrong, D.M. (2010). Sketch for a systematic metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 2. ISBN 9780199655915. 


  • (Wikipedia, 2009) ⇒ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abstracta
    • In philosophy it is commonly considered that every object is both abstract and concrete and/or neither or both. Abstract objects are sometimes called abstracta (sing. abstractum) and concrete objects are sometimes called concreta (sing. concretum). The abstract-concrete distinction is often introduced and initially understood in terms of paradigmatic examples of objects of each kind:

  • http://sigma.ontologyportal.org:4010/sigma/Browse.jsp?lang=EnglishLanguage&kb=SUMO&term=Abstract
    • "Properties or qualities as distinguished from any particular embodiment of the properties/ qualities in a physical medium. Instances of Abstract can be said to exist in the same sense as mathematical objects such as sets and relations, but they cannot exist at a particular place and time without some physical encoding or embodiment.”

      It can be a "Quantity Attribute SetOrClass Relation Proposition"


  • (Bach, 2008) ⇒ Kent Bach. (2008). “On Referring and Not Referring.” In: Reference: Interdisciplinary Perspectives.” Jeanette K. Gundel and Nancy Hedberg, editors. Oxford University Press.
    • QUOTE: Like it or not, proper names do have non-referential uses, including attribute uses and predicative uses. …

      … Consider that in standard first-order logic the role of proper names is play by individual constants and existence is represented by the existential qualifier. … We have to resort to using a formula like '∃x(x=n)', which is to say there exists something identical to n. And, when there is not such thing as [math]\displaystyle{ n }[/math], we can't use the negation of a formula of that form '¬ ∃x(x=n)', to express the truth that there isn't anything to which [math]\displaystyle{ n }[/math] is identical, because standard first-order logic disallows empty names.... Russell had a logical motivation for insisting that a genuine name be one which is (epistemically) guaranteed to have a referent. …

      … Even more problematic is the case of negative existentials, and the related problem of empty names. (To assert, for example, that Hamlet does not exist is surely not to assert of Hamlet that he does not exist, mush less to presuppose that he exists. It is possible to argue that Hamlet is a fictional character, specifically an abstract entity created by Shakespeare.