Philosophy of Mind

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A Philosophy of Mind is a philosophy whose focus is mental processes.



References

2015

  • (Wikipedia, 2015) ⇒ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/philosophy_of_mind Retrieved:2015-5-6.
    • Philosophy of mind is a branch of philosophy that studies the nature of the mind, mental events, mental functions, mental properties, consciousness, and their relationship to the physical body, particularly the brain. The mind–body problem, i.e. the relationship of the mind to the body, is commonly seen as one key issue in philosophy of mind, although there are other issues concerning the nature of the mind that do not involve its relation to the physical body, such as how consciousness is possible and the nature of particular mental states.[1] [2] [3]

      Dualism and monism are the two major schools of thought that attempt to resolve the mind–body problem. Dualism can be traced back to Plato,[4] and the Sankhya and Yoga schools of Hindu philosophy,[5] but it was most precisely formulated by René Descartes in the 17th century.[6] Substance dualists argue that the mind is an independently existing substance, whereas property dualists maintain that the mind is a group of independent properties that emerge from and cannot be reduced to the brain, but that it is not a distinct substance.[7]

      Monism is the position that mind and body are not ontologically distinct kinds of entities (independent substances). This view was first advocated in Western philosophy by Parmenides in the 5th century BC and was later espoused by the 17th century rationalist Baruch Spinoza.[8] Physicalists argue that only entities postulated by physical theory exist, and that mental processes will eventually be explained in terms of these entities as physical theory continues to evolve. Physicalists maintain various positions on the prospects of reducing mental properties to physical properties (many of whom adopt compatible forms of property dualism),[9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] and the ontological status of such mental properties remains unclear.[13][15] [16] Idealists maintain that the mind is all that exists and that the external world is either mental itself, or an illusion created by the mind. Neutral monists such as Ernst Mach and William James argue that events in the world can be thought of as either mental (psychological) or physical depending on the network of relationships into which they enter, and dual-aspect monists such as Spinoza adhere to the position that there is some other, neutral substance, and that both matter and mind are properties of this unknown substance. The most common monisms in the 20th and 21st centuries have all been variations of physicalism; these positions include behaviorism, the type identity theory, anomalous monism and functionalism.[17]

      Most modern philosophers of mind adopt either a reductive or non-reductive physicalist position, maintaining in their different ways that the mind is not something separate from the body.[17] These approaches have been particularly influential in the sciences, especially in the fields of sociobiology, computer science, evolutionary psychology and the various neurosciences.[18] [19] [20] [21] Other philosophers, however, adopt a non-physicalist position that challenges the notion that the mind is a purely physical construct. Reductive physicalists assert that all mental states and properties will eventually be explained by scientific accounts of physiological processes and states.[22] [23] [24] Non-reductive physicalists argue that although the mind is not a separate substance, mental properties supervene on physical properties, or that the predicates and vocabulary used in mental descriptions and explanations are indispensable, and cannot be reduced to the language and lower-level explanations of physical science.[25] [26] Continued neuroscientific progress has helped to clarify some of these issues; however, they are far from being resolved. Modern philosophers of mind continue to ask how the subjective qualities and the intentionality of mental states and properties can be explained in naturalistic terms.[27] [28]

  1. Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named Kim1
  2. Siegel, S.: The Contents of Visual Experience. New York: Oxford University Press. 2010
  3. Macpherson, F. & Haddock, A., editors, Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
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  7. Hart, W.D. (1996) "Dualism", in Samuel Guttenplan (org) A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell, Oxford, 265-7.
  8. Spinoza, Baruch (1670) Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (A Theologico-Political Treatise).
  9. Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named Schneider2013
  10. Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named DePaulBaltimore2013
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  13. 13.0 13.1 Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named Francescotti
  14. See also See also .
  15. Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named McLaughlinAndBennett
  16. Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named Megill2012
  17. 17.0 17.1 Kim, J., "Mind–Body Problem", Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Ted Honderich (ed.). Oxford:Oxford University Press. 1995.
  18. Pinel, J. Psychobiology, (1990) Prentice Hall, Inc. ISBN 88-15-07174-1
  19. LeDoux, J. (2002) The Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are, New York:Viking Penguin. ISBN 88-7078-795-8
  20. Russell, S. and Norvig, P. Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach, New Jersey:Prentice Hall. ISBN 0-13-103805-2
  21. Dawkins, R. The Selfish Gene (1976) Oxford:Oxford University Press. ISBN
  22. Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named Pat
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  26. Putnam, Hilary (1967). “Psychological Predicates", in W. H. Capitan and D. D. Merrill, eds., Art, Mind and Religion (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.)
  27. Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named Int
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