Mental Property
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A Mental Property is an emergent property of a mind.
- AKA: Cognitive Property.
- Example(s):
- Memory and memories.
- Intelligence
- Counter-Example(s):
- a Human Brain Property, such as a weight and volume.
- a Concept Property.
- See: Philosophy Of Mind, Ontology, Mind Body Problem, Physicalism, Neurology, Property Dualism, Reductionism, Eliminativism, Folk Psychology, Intentionality.
References
2014
- (Wikipedia, 2014) ⇒ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/mental_property Retrieved:2014-1-11.
- A mental property or a mind property is a property of a/the mind. The term is mostly used in philosophy of mind, without prejudice as to the ontological status of mental properties. Examples might include genreal properties, such as being able to tho or rememeber, or more fine grained one as "having a thought about Paris". The term is often used in the context of the mind body problem. For (non eliminative) physicalists, mental prroperties are a kind of high level property which can be understood in terms of fine-grained neural activity. Property dualists, on the other hand, claim that no such reductive explanation is possible. Eliminativists may reject the existence of mental properties, or at leas of those corresponding to folk psychological categories such as thought and memory. Some philosophers seek to find a unifying characteristic for the generally accepted mental properties: a famous example is Franz Brentano's claim that all mental properties are characterised by intentionality or "aboutness".
- A mental property or a mind property is a property of a/the mind. The term is mostly used in philosophy of mind, without prejudice as to the ontological status of mental properties. Examples might include genreal properties, such as being able to tho or rememeber, or more fine grained one as "having a thought about Paris". The term is often used in the context of the mind body problem. For (non eliminative) physicalists, mental prroperties are a kind of high level property which can be understood in terms of fine-grained neural activity. Property dualists, on the other hand, claim that no such reductive explanation is possible. Eliminativists may reject the existence of mental properties, or at leas of those corresponding to folk psychological categories such as thought and memory. Some philosophers seek to find a unifying characteristic for the generally accepted mental properties: a famous example is Franz Brentano's claim that all mental properties are characterised by intentionality or "aboutness".