2002 HyponymyAndItsVarieties

• (Cruse, 2002) ⇒ D. Alan Cruse. (2002). “Hyponymy and its Varieties.” In: (Green et al., 2002).

Subject Headings: Hyponymy.

Cited by

• ~16 http://scholar.google.com/scholar?cites=18402774976871400984

Quotes

Abstract

• This chapter deals with the paradigmatic sense relation of hyponymy as manifested in nouns. A number of approaches to the definition of the relation are discussed, with particular attention being given to the problems of framing a prototype-theoretical characterization. An account is offered of a number of

1 Introduction

• Hyponymy and its natural partner, incompatibility, are described by Lyons as "the most fundamental paradigmatic relations of sense in terms of which the vocabulary is structured" (1968, p453). Of all sense relations, they certainly occur across the widest range of grammatical categories and content domains. Hyponym-hyperonym pairs can be observed in all the major syntactic categories (more rarely in the minor categories). But a short time with a dictionary will be sufficient to convince anyone that it is much easier to come up with noun hyponyms than other types.

2 What do Sense Relations Relate

• An important basic question that must be faced at the outset is this: Hyponymy is a relation of meaning, but what are the entities that it relates? There are actually two questions here. The first concerns the 'size' of the meaning units involved; the second concerns their ontological status.

3.1 Logical Definitions

• Taking a logical approach, we can define hyponymy either extensionally or intensionally. One extensional definition is the following, after Cann (1994), but modified to exclude synonymy:
  • X is a hyponym of Y iff there exists a meaning postulate relation X' and Y' of the form:
  • ∀x[X'(x) → Y'(x)], but none of the form: ∀x[Y'(x) → X'(x)].
• (Here, X' and Y' are the logical constants corresponding to the lexical items X and Y, and the definition states, effectively, that for X to be a hyponym of Y, the extension of X' must be included in the extension of Y'.)
• The problem with this sort of definition, at least from the point of view of lexical semantics, is that the relation is not shown to arise from the meanings (in the ordinary sense) of X and Y; that is to say, we do not know what it is about the meanings of X and Y that gives rise to the relation.
• An example of an intensional definition is the following:
  • X is a hyponym of Y iff F(X) entails, but is not entailed by F(Y).
• (This sort of definition, but not in this exact form, was first put forward by Lyons (1963). Here, F(-) is a sentential function satisfied by X and Y.)
• The propositional relation of entailment is closer to lexical semantic concerns that the relation of material implication that appears in the extensional definition above, as it is understood as arising directly from meaning. But the intensional definition also has serious problems, because although it words in certain obvious cases (It's a dog unilaterally entails It's an animal), it is not generally the case that F(X) entails F(Y). There are cases where F(Y) entails F(X).
• It's not an animal entails It's not a dog.

All animals breathe entails All dogs breathe

• It's not a dog entails All dogs beathe.
• then it breathes entails If it's a dog, then it breather.

Reference Citations

• Ronnie Cann. (1993). “Formal Semantics.” Cambridge University Press
• John Lyons. (1963). “Structural Semantics.” Cambridge University Press
• John Lyons. (1968). “Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics.” Cambridge University Press,

	Author	volume	Date Value	title	type	journal	titleUrl	doi	note	year
2002 HyponymyAndItsVarieties	D. Alan Cruse			Hyponymy and its Varieties			http://books.google.com/books?id=hbdRjdwUGjgC&oi=fnd&pg=PA23			2002