Truth Bearing Statement

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A Truth Bearing Statement is a statement can be mapped to truth or falsity.



References

2014

2013

  • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
    • The term ‘proposition’ has a broad use in contemporary philosophy. It is used to refer to some or all of the following: the primary bearers of truth-value, the objects of belief and other “propositional attitudes” (i.e., what is believed, doubted, etc.[1]), the referents of that-clauses, and the meanings of sentences. Propositions are the sharable objects of the attitudes and the primary bearers of truth and falsity. This stipulation rules out certain candidates for propositions, including thought- and utterance-tokens, which presumably are not sharable, and concrete events or facts, which presumably cannot be false.


2012

  • http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/
    • The term ‘proposition’ has a broad use in contemporary philosophy. It is used to refer to some or all of the following: the primary bearers of truth-value, the objects of belief and other “propositional attitudes” (i.e., what is believed, doubted, etc.[1]), the referents of that-clauses, and the meanings of sentences.

      One might wonder whether a single class of entities can play all these roles. If David Lewis (1986, p. 54) is right in saying that “the conception we associate with the word ‘proposition’ may be something of a jumble of conflicting desiderata,” then it will be impossible to capture our conception in a consistent definition.

      The best way to proceed, when dealing with quasi-technical words like ‘proposition’, may be to stipulate a definition and proceed with caution, making sure not to close off any substantive issues by definitional fiat.

      Propositions, we shall say, are the sharable objects of the attitudes and the primary bearers of truth and falsity. This stipulation rules out certain candidates for propositions, including thought- and utterance-tokens, which presumably are not sharable, and concrete events or facts, which presumably cannot be false. These consequences fit well with contemporary usage. Our definition leaves open many of the questions dividing propositionalists: which additional roles are propositions fit to play? would propositions have to be mind-independent or abstract? what individuation conditions would they have? how would they relate to facts? We examine these issues below, as well as the fundamental issue of whether there are propositions at all.

2011


  • http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/
    • Most contemporary philosophers characterize belief as a “propositional attitude”. Propositions are generally taken to be whatever it is that sentences express (see the entry on propositions). For example, if two sentences mean the same thing (e.g., “snow is white” in English, “Schnee ist weiss” in German), they express the same proposition, and if two sentences differ in meaning, they express different propositions. (Here we are setting aside some complications about that might arise in connection with indexicals; see the entry on indexicals.) A propositional attitude, then, is the mental state of having some attitude, stance, take, or opinion about a proposition or about the potential state of affairs in which that proposition is true — a mental state of the sort canonically expressible in the form “S A that P”, where S picks out the individual possessing the mental state, A picks out the attitude, and P is a sentence expressing a proposition. For example: Ahmed [the subject] hopes [the attitude] that Alpha Centauri hosts intelligent life [the proposition], or Yifeng [the subject] doubts [the attitude] that New York City will exist in four hundred years. What one person doubts or hopes, another might fear, or believe, or desire, or intend — different attitudes, all toward the same proposition. Contemporary discussions of belief are often embedded in more general discussions of the propositional attitudes; and treatments of the propositional attitudes often take belief as the first and foremost example.


2009

  • WordNet
    • Proposition: (logic) a statement that affirms or denies something and is either true or false


  • (Wikipedia, 2009) ⇒ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
    • In logic and philosophy, proposition refers to either (a) the "content" or "meaning" of a meaningful declarative sentence or (b) the pattern of symbols, marks, or sounds that make up a meaningful declarative sentence. Propositions in either case are intended to be truth-bearers, that is, they are either true or false.

      The existence of propositions in the former sense, as well as the existence of "meanings", is disputed. Where the concept of a "meaning" is admitted, its nature is controversial. In earlier texts writers have not always made it sufficiently clear whether they are using the term proposition in sense of the words or the "meaning" expressed by the words. To avoid the controversies and ontological implications, the term sentence is often now used instead of proposition to refer to just those strings of symbols that are truth-bearers, being either true or false under an interpretation. Strawson advocated the use of the term "statement".


  • http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/proposition
    • 1. (uncountable) The act of offering (an idea) for consideration.
    • 2. (countable) An idea or a plan offered.
    • 3. (countable) (in business settings) The terms of a transaction offered.
    • 4. (countable) (logic) The content of an assertion that may be taken as being true or false and is considered abstractly without reference to the linguistic sentence that constitutes the assertion.
    • 5. In some states of the US, a proposed statute or constitutional amendment to be voted on by the electorate.
    • 6. In mathematics, a proposition is an assertion formulated in such a way that it may be proved true or false.



  • http://www.logic-classroom.info/glossary.htm
    • proposition is a form of words in which the predicate is either affirmed or denied of the subject; the meaning expressed by a declarative sentence. (Intro)
  • http://planetmath.org/encyclopedia/Lemma.html
    • There is no technical distinction between a lemma, a proposition, and a theorem. A lemma is a proven statement, typically named a lemma to distinguish it as a truth used as a stepping stone to a larger result rather than an important statement in and of itself. Of course, some of the most powerful statements in mathematics are known as lemmas, including Zorn's Lemma, Bezout's Lemma, Gauss' Lemma, Fatou's lemma, etc., so one clearly can't get too much simply by reading into a proposition's name.
    • Even less well-defined is the distinction between a proposition and a theorem. Many authors choose to name results only one or the other, or use both more or less interchangeably. A partially standard set of nomenclature is to use the term proposition to denote a significant result that is still shy of deserving a proper name. In contrast, a theorem under this format would represent a major result, and would often be named in relation to mathematicians who worked on or solved the problem in question.


  • http://planetmath.org/encyclopedia/Lemma.html
    • There is no technical distinction between a lemma, a proposition, and a theorem. A lemma is a proven statement, typically named a lemma to distinguish it as a truth used as a stepping stone to a larger result rather than an important statement in and of itself. Of course, some of the most powerful statements in mathematics are known as lemmas, including Zorn's Lemma, Bezout's Lemma, Gauss' Lemma, Fatou's lemma, etc., so one clearly can't get too much simply by reading into a proposition's name.
      Even less well-defined is the distinction between a proposition and a theorem. Many authors choose to name results only one or the other, or use both more or less interchangeably. A partially standard set of nomenclature is to use the term proposition to denote a significant result that is still shy of deserving a proper name. In contrast, a theorem under this format would represent a major result, and would often be named in relation to mathematicians who worked on or solved the problem in question.

2000

  • (Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet, 2000) ⇒ Gennaro Chierchia, and Sally McConnell-Ginet. (2000). “Meaning and Grammar: An Introduction to Semantics, 2nd edition." MIT Press.
    • QUOTE: Frege proposes that sentences (and indeed, expressions of any category) have not only a reference (a standard translation of the German word Bedeutung) but also a sense (Frege's term was Sinn). The reference of an expression is what it stands for on a given occasion of its use. Its sense, Frege says, is the way in which the reference is presented.

      It is worth reiterating that for Frege senses are not to be thought of as mental or psychological entities. In particular, the sense of a sentence, say, "Pavarotti is Italian," is not what we grasp in hearing it, for the latter, is intrinsically a subjective matter, and varies to a degree from individual to individual. Senses are what enable us to communicate with each other, and as such they must be inter-subjective (or objective). So the notion of a thought for Frege should be construed as something like the information content that we grasp in understanding a sentence. Henceforth we will follow the common practice of using the term proposition for this purpose. A proposition is the sense of a sentence.