(Redirected from Desired Result)
- AKA: Purpose, Desired Result.
- It can (typically) be based on an Agent Belief System.
- It can (typically) involve an Agent Planning Process.
- It can (typically) be associated to an Agent Desire.
- It can range from being a Strong Intention to being a Weak Intention, based on Agent Commitment.
- It can be associated to an Agent Intention Category, such as a moral intention.
- It can range from being a Human Intention to being a Software Agent Intention.
- It can be expressed in a Intention Statement.
- See: Agent Belief, Desire, Mental State, Rational Argument, Time Limit, Future, Mind.
- (Wikipedia, 2017) ⇒ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/intention Retrieved:2017-5-31.
- (Wikipedia, 2015) ⇒ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/goal Retrieved:2015-12-24.
- A goal is a desired result that a person or a system envisions, plans and commits to achieve: a personal or organizational desired end-point in some sort of assumed development. Many people endeavor to reach goals within a finite time by setting deadlines.
- (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006) ⇒ Peter M. Gollwitzer, and Paschal Sheeran. (2006). “Implementation Intentions and Goal Achievement: A Meta-analysis of Effects and Processes.” In: Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 38.
- QUOTE: Holding a strong goal intention (“I intend to reach Z!”) does not guarantee goal achievement, because people may fail to deal effectively with self-regulatory problems during goal striving. This review analyzes whether realization of goal intentions is facilitated by forming an implementation intention that spells out the when, where, and how of goal striving in advance (“If situation Y is encountered, then I will initiate goal‐directed behavior X!”).
- (Frith, 2001) ⇒ Uta Frith. (2001). “Mind blindness and the brain in autism." Neuron 32, no. 6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0896-6273(01)00552-9
- ABSTRACT: Experimental evidence shows that the inability to attribute mental states, such as desires and beliefs, to self and others (mentalizing) explains the social and communication impairments of individuals with autism. Brain imaging studies in normal volunteers highlight a circumscribed network that is active during mentalizing and links medial prefrontal regions with posterior superior temporal sulcus and temporal poles. The brain abnormality that results in mentalizing failure in autism may involve weak connections between components of this system.
- (Bratman, 1993) ⇒ Michael E. Bratman. (1993). “Shared Intention." Ethics, 104(1). http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381695
- (Cohen & Levesque, 1987) ⇒ Philip R. Cohen, and Hector J. Levesque. (1987). “Intention = Choice + Commitment.” In: Proceedings of the Sixth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence. ISBN:0-934613-42-7
- QUOTE: This paper provides a logical analysis of the concept of intention as composed of two more basic concepts, choice (or goal) and commitment. By making explicit the conditions under which an agent can drop her goals, i.e., by specifying how the agent is committed to her goals, the formalism provides analyses for Bratman's three characteristic functional roles played by intentions (Bratman, 1986), and shows how agents can avoid intending all the foreseen side-effects of what they actually intend.
- (Bratman, 1987) ⇒ Michael E. Bratman. (1987). “Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason." Harvard University Press
- BOOK OVERVIEW: What happens to our conception of mind and rational agency when we take seriously future-directed intentions and plans and their roles as inputs into further practical reasoning? The author's initial efforts in responding to this question resulted in a series of papers that he wrote during the early 1980s. In this book, Bratman develops further some of the main themes of these essays and also explores a variety of related ideas and issues. He develops a planning theory of intention. Intentions are treated as elements of partial plans of action. These plans play basic roles in practical reasoning, roles that support the organization of our activities over time and socially. Bratman explores the impact of this approach on a wide range of issues, including the relation between intention and intentional action, and the distinction between intended and expected effects of what one intends.
- (Anscombe, 1957) ⇒ G. E. M. Anscombe. (1957). “Intention." ISBN:978-0-674-00399-6
- (Grice, 1957) ⇒ H. Paul. Grice. (1957). “Meaning." The philosophical review.
- QUOTE: … Similarly in nonlinguistic cases: if we are asking about an agent's intention, a previous expression counts heavily; nevertheless, a man might plan to throw a letter in the dustbin and yet take it to the post; when lifting his hand he might "come to" and say either "I didn't intend to do ...